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INTRODUCTION 
There are three appellees in this case - the Utah State Tax Commission (the 
"Commission"), the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization (the "County"), and the 
Granite School District. The Commission filed a timely response to ATK's Opening 
Brief The County requested an extension of time and will not file its responsive brief 
until or before August 2, 2010. The school district has not filed a brief, nor has it 
requested an extension of time. This Reply Brief is filedin direct response to the 
Commission's Brief ATK will file a second reply after the County files its responsive 
pleading. 
ATK identified three issues in its appeal from the district court decision. The first 
issue concerns the correct interpretation of the exemption from privilege tax for lessees, 
permittees, and easement holders which do not have "exclusive possession" of exempt 
property "used in connection with a business conducted for profit." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-4-101(l)(a). The second issue is whether the district court erred in applying 
third-party standing rules to conclude that ATK did not have standing to assert that the 
privilege tax assessment violated the Supremacy Clause (bf the United States Constitution. 
The final issue directly addressed that constitutional challenge. 
The Commission has only addressed the first and third issues. It explains that it 
"has not taken a position on the issue of ATK's standing." ^-mmission's Brief, p. 12, 
1 
n. 5. Therefore, this reply to the Commission's responsive brief will only address the first 
and third issues. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT ATK HAS 
"EXCLUSIVE USE" OF NIROP EVEN THOUGH THE NAVY RETAINS 
POSSESSION, CONTROL, AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EXEMPT 
PROPERTY. 
The Commission and ATK agree that the first issue before this Court is simply 
whether a lessee or permittee has "exclusive possession" of exempt property when the 
owner retains management and control of the property and maintains a constant presence 
thereon. Commission's Brief, Issue I, p. 1. The Commission has not disputed the fact 
that the Navy maintains a constant presence on NIROP and retains management and 
control responsibilities for that property. See Commission's Brief, Statement of Facts, 
pp. 4-6. 
In its Opening Brief, ATK explained the extent of control which the Navy 
exercises over NIROP as follows: Access to NIROP is controlled by the Navy, (ATK's 
Brief, p. 8 ffl| 6-7); ATK cannot use NIROP other than as directed by its contract with the 
Navy or it faces possible fines or imprisonment (id., p. 9 fflf 9-12, 15); ATK must give 
first priority of use to work on behalf of the Navy (id. f 12); ATK cannot exclude the 
Navy or anyone authorized by it from entering NIROP or using NIROP facilities (id. 
f 13); the government has direct management responsibility for NIROP, limits ATK's use 
of NIROP, and can and does refuse to give permission to ATK to use NIROP (id., pp. 9 
2 
<[ 14, p. 10 f 16); at least 14 Navy personnel maintain a daily presence on NIROP to 
manage maintenance, operation, and usage of NIROP (id, p. 10 ffif 17-18); and all 
improvements and repairs must be authorized and paid for by the Navy, with title to 
improvements vesting in the Navy (id. Tflf 19-20). 
The Commission has not disputed any of these facts because it believes that, under 
Utah law, a beneficial user of exempt property is subject to privilege tax on the full value 
of that property regardless of the interest, control, and possession maintained by the 
property owner. According to the Commission, consideration of the property owner's 
retained interest in evaluating whether a beneficial user has "exclusive possession" of 
property would result in an "unworkable" exemption inasmuch as the property owner 
always retains some type of interest in its property. 
The Commission's interpretation of the exemption does not comply with the 
"well-settled canons of statutory construction" because it (a) disregards the plain statutory 
language, (b) ignores the meaning given to "exclusive possession" by this Court in 
previous decisions, and (c) infers exceptions beyond the plain statutory language. The 
only legal authority upon which the Commission relies for its interpretation of "exclusive 
possession" is the district court's decision which, by the Commission's own admission, 
should be "giv[en] no deference" by this Court. Commission's Brief, p. 1 (Standard of 
Review for Issue(s) I and II), and p. 8. 
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A. The Plain Language of the Exemption Does Not Require this Court to 
Disregard the Retained Interest of the Navy in Determining Whether 
ATK Has "Exclusive Possession" of NIROP. 
In its Opening Brief, ATK explained that Utah law requires this Court to interpret 
the exemption based on "'the statute's plain language [with] resort to other methods of 
statutory interpretation only if the language is ambiguous.'" Gull Labs., Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting USXpress, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm '«, 886 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Commission agrees 
that this is the applicable rule of statutory construction. The Court is also required to 
"read the words of [the] statute literally." Id. In its responsive pleading, the Commission 
has not explained how the plain, literal meaning of "exclusive possession" permits this 
Court to disregard the retained interest of the property owner. 
In contrast, ATK has provided dictionary definitions of "exclusive" (ATK's Brief, 
p. 15); a prior interpretation by this Court regarding the inherent limitations of the word 
"exclusive," Loyal Order of Moose, #259 v. County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 
(Utah 1982)(Court reversed prior decision which had "stretched the 'used exclusively' 
provision beyond its clear meaning"); and discussions of prior decisions by this Court and 
the Utah Court of Appeals in which both courts rejected narrow interpretations of the 
privilege tax exemption because they did not comport with the plain language used in the 
statute. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization v. Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 472, 106 
P.3d 182 (Court refused to restrict scope of "concessionaire" exemption by imposing 
4 
restrictions not found in plain language); County Bd. of Equalization v. Utah State Tax 
Comm % 927 P.2d 176, 184 (Utah 1996)(Court gave effect to plain meaning of 
"proceeds" and held that "'gap-closing' purpose of the privilege tax statute" did not 
justify ignoring plain language). 
The Commission has completely ignored this precedent and offers no alternative 
interpretation of the plain statutory language. Instead, the Commission simply argues that 
adhering to the statute's plain language is "unworkable." This position is based on the 
premise that only a fee-simple owner of property can have "exclusive possession" of that 
property. Inasmuch as this Court has recognized, on multiple occasions, that a lessee of 
real property typically has "exclusive possession" of leased property, the very premise of 
the Commission's argument fails. 
B. The District Court Erred When it Ignored the "Usual and Accepted 
Meaning" of "Exclusive Possession" Which Does Not Render the 
Exemption "'Unreasonably Confused and Inoperable/" 
In its Opening Brief, ATK cited several cases in this jurisdiction wherein this 
Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have recognized that a lessee has "exclusive 
possession" of property even though the property owner retains ownership of that 
property. See ATK's Brief, pp. 19-21, citing Keller v. SouthwoodNorth Medical 
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998); Enercoy Inc. v. $OS Staffing Servs., 2002 UT 
78, 52 P.3d 1272 (lease "must transfer exclusive possession of the space to the lessee"); 
5 
Smith v. Ogusthorpe, 2002 UT App 361 f 38, 58 P.3d 854, 862 ("a leasehold transfers 
exclusive possession"). 
In Keller, this Court held that a lease, by its very nature, transfers "exclusive 
possession" whereas a permit does not. 959 P.2d at 107. This Court explained that a 
license or permit is "subject to the management and control retained by the owner" 
whereas a "lease must convey a definite space and must transfer exclusive possession of 
that space to the lessee." Id. (emphasis added). In its brief discussion of Keller, the 
Commission mischaracterizes the position taken by ATK and the holding of the Keller 
Court. 
First, the Commission mischaracterizes the district court's holding that ATK is a 
permittee and not a lessee as being contrary to the position taken by ATK when it states: 
"The district court concluded, and ATK does not now challenge, 'that the facilities use 
agreement is a permit.'" Commission's Brief, pp. 10-11. This statement suggests that 
ATK, at some point, had challenged the characterization of its Facilities Use Contract as a 
"permit." This inference is incorrect. One of ATK's main arguments to the district court 
was that the Facilities Use Contract is a permit rather than a lease and therefore subject to 
the application of Keller. R. 1082 n. 2. The district court agreed with ATK and held that 
ATK is a permittee. R. 1083. Neither the Commission nor the County have appealed this 
material finding. 
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Second, the Commission mischaracterizes the Keller decision as requiring the 
Court to disregard "the interests 'retained by the owner'" in determining whether a party 
has "exclusive possession" of property. Commission's Brief, p. 11. In Keller this Court ^ 
** '< 
held that a permittee does not have "exclusive possession" of property precisely because /*% 
the property owner retains management and control of the property. The Court held that a 4 
lessee has "exclusive possession" whereas a permittee does not because a permittee only 
has "the permission or authority to engage in a particular act or series of acts upon the 
land of another without possessing an interest therein," and "is 'subject to the 
management and control retained by the owner.'" 959 P.2d at 107, quoting 25 Am. Jr. 2d 
Easements and Licenses § 137 (1996) and 49 Am Jr. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 21 (1996). 
The Commission inexplicably argues that the foregoing language "excludes the 
interests of the property owner" and claims that the district court complied with Keller "in 
construing the statutory language 'exclusive possession' to hold that the retained interests 
of the government need not be considered in determining whether ATK qualified for an 
exemption." Commission's Brief, p. II.1 ATK does not understand how the Commission 
could possibly have arrived at this interpretation of Keller. The Keller Court recognized 
1
 The Commission's claim that the district court's decision is consistent with 
Keller is ironic inasmuch as the district court refused to follow Keller on the basis that 
Keller was a forcible entry action. R. 1083. ATK explained in its Opening Brief that the 
district court's basis for disregarding Keller was error. ATK's Brief, pp. 21-22. Before 
the Court could resolve the forcible entry claim, it held that it "must first determine if a 
leasehold existed." Keller, 959 P.2d at 107. The nature of the plaintiffs interest in the 
property was not dependent on the type of claim he was asserting. The Commission has 
not refuted ATK's argument on this point. 
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that the owner's retention of possession, management, control, and other property 
interests is a defining characteristic of a license. The Court was unequivocal in its 
recognition that, whereas a lease conveys "exclusive possession," a license does not, 
precisely because the property owner retains management and control of the property. 
959 P.2d at 107. There is nothing in Keller to support the Commission's claim that the 
Keller Court defined license to "exclude[] the interests of the property owner," 
Commission's Brief, p. 11. 
The Commission's claim that ATK's interpretation of the exemption is "non-
sensical" is directly refuted by the Keller Court's acknowledgment that a lessee has 
exclusive possession of leased property. ATK has consistently maintained that a lessee of 
exempt property will typically have exclusive possession of the exempt property and will 
be subject to a privilege tax for its beneficial use of such property. Under ATK's 
interpretation of the statute, the privilege tax exemption for exclusive possession would 
apply only where the beneficial user had a lease to use the exempt property. In its brief, 
ATK explained that this interpretation is not at odds with the statutory reference to 
permits and easements because a document purporting to be a "permit" or "easement" 
may, in fact, be a lease which conveys exclusive possession. See ATK's Brief, p. 25. 
$ ^ 1 The Keller Court recognized that the parties' characterization of their transaction is not 
1„^ legally binding. 959 P.2d at 107. As ATK explained in its Opening Brief, "[t]he 
statutory reference to 'any lease, permit, or easement,' does not imbue such conveyances 
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with the characteristics they purport to exhibit." ATK's Brief, p. 25. Thus, an agreement 
may be called a lease, permit, or easement and not substantively qualify for its title. The 
Commission has not contested this point. 
In contrast, the Commission's interpretation would require a privilege tax in "the 
same amount that the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the 
owner of the property" even when a user has an easement which only pertains to a 
fraction of the "premises to which the lease, permit, or easement relates," or a permit 
which grants extremely limited use of the property. This interpretation of "exclusive 
possession" is unworkable inasmuch as it would impose privilege tax in excess of the 
value of a permittee's beneficial use of the exempt property. 
The Commission's brief is devoid of any legal authority which supports its narrow 
interpretation of the privilege tax exemption. Instead the Commission relies entirely on 
the district court's decision as authority for its claim that ATK's interpretation of 
"exclusive possession" would render the exemption inoperable. As the Commission has 
already acknowledged, this Court should not "'defer to the legal conclusions of the 
district court,'" Commission's Brief, p. 8, quoting Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs of 
Wasatch County, 2008 UT 6, 17, 178 P.3d 893. All available legal precedent supports the 
interpretation advocated by ATK. 
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C. The Commission Has Not Refuted ATK's Claim That the District 
Court's Interpretation "Infers Substantive Terms" into the Exemption, 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction, equally applicable to statutory 
exemptions, is that courts must not "infer substantive terms into the text that are not 
already there." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367 (Utah 1994). In its Opening 
Brief, ATK explained that the district court's interpretation of the exemption infers 
substantive terms which are not contained in the statute's plain language. ATK's Brief, 
pp. 26-28. The Commission's interpretation would impermissibly alter the plain meaning 
of "exclusive possession" by disregarding all shared possession of the exempt property 
except for possession by parties who are using the property for financial benefit. 
Commission's Brief, p. II.2 The district court's interpretation also alters the exemption 
by disallowing the exemption where shared possession is perceived as benefitting the user 
of the exempt property. As ATK explained, these exceptions are not a part of the statute 
as it is written and the alleged benefit to ATK is irrelevant to the analysis of whether 
2
 The Commission claims that the Court should focus only on "'the possession or 
other beneficial use' of the property 'used in connection with a business for profit.'" 
Commission's Brief, p. 11. In other words, the Commission would have the Court 
disregard all use or possession of the exempt property except for the for-profit use granted 
pursuant to any leases, permits, or easements. The statute simply does not make such a 
distinction. 
10 
ATK had exclusive possession. ATK's Brief, pp. 26-28.3 The Commission has not 
responded to this argument. 
The exemption from privilege tax applies, without limitation, to "the use or 
possession of any lease, permit, or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles 
the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the prerpises to which the lease, permit 
or easement relates." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(e). Control, management, and 
possession by an exempt property owner directly diminishes the degree to which the 
beneficial user possesses the property. In this case, the district court found, and the 
Commission does not dispute, that the Navy retains possession, management, and control 
of NIROP. See ATK's Statement of Relevant Facts, ATK's Brief, pp. 7-10 (undisputed 
by Commission); and R. 1081, 1084, and 1090. The plain statutory language and all 
available precedent do not support the district court's conclusion that ATK has "exclusive 
possession" of NIROP even though the Navy maintains a constant presence on that 
property. R. 1084. 
In County Bd. of Equalization, this Court refused to restrict the meaning of 
"proceeds" even though its interpretation would fully exempt all leases in Research Park 
from privilege tax. 927 P.2d at 184. The Utah Court of Appeals likewise refused to 
impose restrictions on the meaning of "concessionaire" when it interpreted a privilege tax 
3
 ATK also explained that the characterization of the Navy's presence, 
management, and control as "beneficial to ATK" ignores the fact that ATK used NIROP 
to fulfill Navy contracts. See ATK's Brief, p. 27, n. 7. The Commission has not refuted 
this fact. 
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exemption. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 2004 UT App 472 ^18 n. 5, 106 P.3d 
at 186 n. 5. This Court held that the '"gap-closing' purpose of the privilege tax" does not 
justify ignoring the plain language of the statutory exemption. County Bd. of Equal, 927 
P.2d at 184. Furthermore, the Court explained that the exemptions, including the one at 
the heart of this appeal, reflect the apparent intent of the Utah legislature to "broaden the 
types of property exempt from Utah's privilege tax." Id. at 180 (emphasis added). The 
district court's decision to "interpret taxation statutes strictly against ATK" (R. 1084) 
does not excuse its disregard of the statute's plain language or of applicable legal 
precedent. There is no legal basis for this Court to conclude that ATK has "exclusive 
possession" of property owned, managed, and possessed by the Navy. The plain statutory 
language and the precedent established by this Court require reversal of the district 
court's interpretation of the statutory exemption. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVILEGE 
TAX EXEMPTION VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE BY TAXING 
THE NAVY'S RETAINED INTEREST IN NIROP. 
The Supremacy Clause prohibits state and local governments from taxing the 
United States or its agencies. Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 
1964). The district court has interpreted the privilege tax statute as requiring a tax on the 
full value of the exempt property even when the federal government retains possession 
and control of that property. R. 1084. According to the district court, ATK had 
"exclusive possession" of NIROP, therefore "its beneficial use of the NIROP Property 
12 
was the value of the NIROP Property and there was no tax assessed against the Navy." 
R. 1086. 
The Commission defends the district court's decision because the privilege tax 
"does not directly tax the Government's property." Commission's Brief, p. 12. However, 
the position taken by the Commission cannot be reconciled with the Commission's own 
recognition of the fact that imposing the tax on the user of the property may nonetheless 
violate the Supremacy Clause because a "[t]he tax on the use of property is 'valid only to 
the extent that it reaches the contractor's interest in Government-owned property.'" 
Commission Brief, pp. 14-15, quoting United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 741 
n. 14(1982). 
Supremacy Clause analysis requires consideration of the government's retained 
interest in property. The fact that the district court did not consider the Navy's interest to 
be relevant to its interpretation of "exclusive possession," does not mean that the district 
court can also ignore the Navy's interest for purposes of Supremacy Clause analysis. The 
Commission's response to the Supremacy Clause argument echoes the circularity inherent 
in the district court's reasoning that, because government control is irrelevant to 
"exclusive possession," it is somehow irrelevant to Supremacy Clause analysis. The 
Commission offers no legal authority to support the district court's creation of an 
exception to the constitutional prohibition of taxation of the federal government or its 
agencies by state and local government. The Commission'k response to ATK's brief also 
13 
includes some rather blatant misinterpretations and mischaracterizations of case law and 
of the arguments asserted by ATK. 
A. The District Court's Interpretation of "Exclusive Possession" Renders 
the Privilege Tax Unconstitutional, 
A governing principle of the rules of statutory interpretation is that, where 
possible, a statute must be interpreted in a manner which is harmonious with state and 
federal constitutions. Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co,, 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990), see 
also Due South, Inc. v. Dep 7 of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 2008 UT 71 f 39, 197 P.3d 82 
("We will construe a statute as constitutional wherever possible, resolving any reasonable 
doubt in favor of constitutionality.")- Rather than evaluate the constitutionality of its 
interpretation of "exclusive possession," the district court used its interpretation to create 
an exception to the constitutional prohibition of taxation of the federal government and its 
agencies by state and local government. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that, "[t]he tax on the use of property 
is 'valid only to the extent that it reaches the contractor's interest in Government-owned 
property." New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 741 n. 14. When a tax is based on the full value of 
the property, and the government retains possession, management, and control of that 
property, the tax exceeds the value of the contractor's interest in the property and violates 
the Supremacy Clause. United States v. Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Colo. 1978), 
affd, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980), affdsub nom., Jefferson County v. United States, 
450 U.S. 901(1981). 
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The district court recognized that the Navy maintained possession and control of 
NIROP. R. 1084. However, the court held that ATK had "exclusive possession" of the 
property because no one besides ATK and the Navy had the right to use or possess 
NIROP. ATK argued that this interpretation violates the Supremacy Clause because the 
statute requires the privilege tax to be assessed at the full value of the exempt property. 
ATK explained that, when a property owner retains possession and control of the exempt 
property, the possession and control exercised by the beneficial user is directly and 
negatively impacted. Thus, a privilege tax on the full value of that property necessarily 
taxes the value of the exempt owner's retained interest in that property. 
The district court mistakenly believed that the Supremacy Clause issue was 
resolved by its interpretation of "exclusive possession": 
The court has already found that ATK has 'exclusive possession' of the 
NIROP Property. If ATK's possession of the NIROP Property was 
exclusive, its beneficial use of the NIROP Property was the value of the 
NIROP Property and there was no tax assessed against the Navy. See U.S. 
v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 741-42 (1982). 
R. 1086. The district court's Final Order similarly states: "Since ATK's possession was 
exclusive, its beneficial use of the NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property 
and no tax was assessed against the Navy." R. 1091.4 
4
 The district court also held that the privilege tax was apportioned based on 
ATK's use of the property: 
Additionally, and contrary to ATK's assertions, the privilege tax was 
apportioned according to ATK's beneficial use. ATK exclusively 
possessed and/or beneficially used all but 15 of the improvements on the 
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The district court's conclusion that "ATK has 'exclusive possession' of the NIROP 
Property" does not resolve the Supremacy Clause issue. To the contrary, the district 
court's resolution of the interpretative issue creates the constitutional dilemma precisely 
because it disregards the federal government's retained interest in the exempt property. 
Under the district court's interpretation, a privilege tax on the full value of exempt 
property is appropriate no matter how much control, management, or possession is 
retained by the exempt owner of the property. 
The Commission continues to claim that the privilege tax based on the full value of 
NIROP is appropriate because, other than the Navy or ATK, "[n]o other entity used the 
property for any purpose, nor did any entity hold a facilities use contract allowing it to use 
the property." Commission's Brief, p. 15. Like the district court, the Commission 
mistakenly focuses on whether a third "other entity" has use of the property. However, 
the interest which is relevant to the Supremacy Clause analysis is the interest of the 
exempt federal government. 
NIROP Property. Salt Lake County did not assess a privilege tax against 
the unused buildings as they were found to have no value. Accordingly, 
Salt Lake County only assessed a privilege tax against ATK for the actual 
possession and the actual other beneficial use ATK enjoyed on the NIROP 
Property. 
R. 1086-1087. In its Opening Brief, ATK explained that the statute does not allow 
apportionment, but requires assessment at the full value of the property. ATK's Brief, 
p. 39. It also explained that the court's finding was contrary to the facts of the case. Id. 
Accordingly, the district court's claim that the "privilege tax was apportioned according 
to ATK's beneficial use" is reversible error. The Commission has not rebutted this 
argument. 
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The district court found that the Navy maintained a constant presence on NIROP. 
R. 1084. It also found that the Navy retained management and control of NIROP. Id. 
Yet because the district court believed the Navy's retained interest in NIROP was 
irrelevant to its interpretation of "exclusive possession," it concluded that the Navy's 
interest was likewise irrelevant to the Supremacy Clause analysis. Neither the district 
court nor the Commission have provided any legal authority to justify ignoring the 
property interest of the very party the Supremacy Clause was designed to protect! The 
district court erred when it concluded that its interpretation of "exclusive possession" 
gave it the right to ignore the government's retained interest in NIROP under Supremacy 
Clause analysis. 
B. The Commission's Attempts to Distinguish Cases Relied on by ATK 
Are Based on Misinterpretations of Those Cases. 
In support of its claim that the district court's interpretation of the privilege tax 
exemption violated the Supremacy Clause, ATK relied on several cases, including United 
I 
States v. Colorado; United States v. Nye County, 938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Nye County, 178 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. County of Fresno, 
429 U.S. 452 (1977); United States v. Hawkins County, 859 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988); and 
United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). Although the Commission tries to 
distinguish these cases, its attempts to do so are based on misrepresentations of those 
cases. 
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First of all, the Commission asks this Court to "hold that the district court did not 
err in its application of New Mexico." Commission's Brief, p. 16. This request is 
somewhat puzzling inasmuch as ATK has not argued that the district court erred in its 
reliance on that case. If the Navy did not retain any interest in NIROP, then Atew Mexico 
would permit a privilege tax assessment on the full value of NIROP. Because ATK's 
interest in the property is limited by the Navy's possession, management and control of 
NIROP, the tax should have been assessed "only to the extent that it reaches the 
contractor's interest in the Government-owned property." New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 741, 
n. 14. The Commission also relies on New Mexico to claim victory on a point which is 
not contended. It states, "ATK has failed to establish that it was an 'agency or 
instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically 
be viewed as separate entities, as least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned." 
Commission's Brief, p. 15. ATK has never argued that it enjoys immunity from privilege 
tax because it is "closely connected to the Government."5 
The Commission then mischaracterizes United States v. County of Fresno, 429 
U.S. 452 (1977), alleging that Fresno "make[s] plain the validity of the mechanism used 
5
 The Commission devoted an entire section of its discussion of the Supremacy 
Clause issue to a discussion of Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson. Commission's Brief, 
pp. 18-19. The Commission claims that Thiokol governs this case even though the district 
court did not rely on Thiokol, and ATK has explained that the issue in Thiokol is not the 
same issue before this Court. ATK's Brief, p. 34, n. 11. The issue before the Thiokol 
Court was whether Thiokol was an agent of the government such that it enjoyed 
governmental immunity from tax. ATK has never alleged that it is immune to the 
privilege tax as an agent of the government. Thiokol has no application to this appeal. 
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by Utah to measure its privilege tax." Commission's Brief, p. 17. The Commission's 
claim that Fresno supports a privilege tax on the full value of exempt property is an 
unfortunate mischaracterization of controlling law. The assessments at issue in Fresno 
were upheld because they were not based on the full value of the property, but were 
reduced "to take account of the limitations on the use of the houses imposed by the 
Government." Fresno, 429 U.S. at 464. 
In that case, the counties of Fresno and Tuolumne imposed a property tax on the 
possessory interest of the Forest Service employees in the federally owned houses in 
which they were required to live. The rent charged to those employees was adjusted to 
reflect "the fact that the Forest Service reserved the right to remove employees from their 
houses at any time, to enter the houses with or without notice for inspection purposes, and 
to use part or all of the houses for official purposes in an emergency." Id. at 455. The 
Court found that, "[i]n computing the value of the possessory interests on which the tax is 
imposed, the counties used the annual estimated fair rental value of the houses, 
discounted to take into account essentially the same factors considered by the Forest 
Service in computing the amount that it deducted from the salaries of employees who 
used the houses." Id. at 456. The Court upheld the tax because the counties "have sought 
to tax only the individual appellants' interests in the Forest Service houses and have 
reduced their assessments to take account of the limitations on the use of the houses 
imposed by the Government." Id. at 464. The Court founc^  it significant that "both 
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[Counties] have sought to take account of these disadvantages and to tax the employees 
only on the portion of the total value of the houses which may be properly attributed to 
their possessory interest." Id. at 466. This case supports ATK's claim that the privilege 
tax should "take account of the limitations on the use of [the property] imposed by the 
Government." Id. at 464. 
The Commission likewise claimed that City of Detroit, and its companion cases 
"make plain the validity of the mechanism used by Utah to measure its privilege tax." 
Commission's Brief, p. 17. While those cases held that a privilege tax could be legally 
imposed for the beneficial use of government property, they did not, as alleged by the 
Commission, unequivocally establish that privilege tax must be measured by the full 
value of government-owned property. In fact, in New Mexico, the Supreme Court cited 
City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958), one of the companion cases to U.S. 
v. City of Detroit, for the proposition that "a use tax may be valid only to the extent that it 
reaches the contractor's interest in Government-owned property." New Mexico, 455 U.S. 
at 741 n. 14. 
The Commission again mischaraterizes applicable precedent when it alleges that 
ATK has erred in its reliance on United States v. Colorado, and that the case is 
inapplicable. Commission's Brief, pp. 19-20. According to the Commission, the 
Colorado Court "did not reach the question raised by ATK here." Id. at 19. The 
Commission's claim that Colorado does not apply is explained by the following statement 
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in which the Commission erroneously attributes a direct (juote from the Fresno Court to 
the Colorado district court: 
The Colorado district court stated that as far as Allegheny stands for the 
proposition that use of government property by 'a private citizen may not be 
taxed at its foil value where contractual restrictions on its use for the 
Government's benefit render the property less valuable to the user, the case 
has no application here.' 460 F. Supp. at 1189 (emphasis added). 
Commission's Brief, pp. 19-20. 
The language which the Commission attributed to the Colorado Court was a direct 
quote of the Supreme Court's explanation in Fresno that Allegheny6 had "no application" 
to the Fresno case because the tax challenged in Fresno applied "only [to] the individual 
appellants' interests in the Forest Service houses" and assessments were reduced "to take 
account of the limitations on the use of the houses imposed by the Government." 
Colorado, 460 F. Supp. at 1189, quoting Fresno, 429 U.S. at 463 n. 10. The Fresno 
Court did not need to evaluate the case under Allegheny because the tax already 
accounted for the property owner's limitations on use. 
In contrast, the tax at issue in Colorado was assessed on the foil value of the 
exempt property. Hence, the Colorado Court specifically observed that the United States 
6
 In United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944), the Supreme Court 
held that a tax measured by the value of government-owned property could not be 
imposed on the private party using that property. This case was later overruled by United 
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), which recognized that privilege tax does 
not run afoul of the United States Constitution. However a limitation on the imposition 
of privilege tax was later identified by the Court in New Mexico where the Court stated 
that a tax should be assessed "only to the extent that it reaches the contractor's interest in 
the government-owned property." 455U.S.at741,n. 14. 
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Supreme Court "recognized the continuing vitality of the Allegheny decision with respect 
to the need for segregating any beneficial and taxable interest from the frill value of 
Government-owned property where there are limitations imposed on the use of that 
property." Id. The Colorado Court held that a tax on the full value of exempt property 
which does not "account[] for any of the imposed limitations on [the permittee's] use of 
the property,. . . subjected the property and the activities of the Federal Government to 
state and local taxation and thereby infringed upon the immunity of the United States 
from the imposition of taxes upon its own property." Id. This case is directly on point 
and is entirely consistent with the position taken by ATK in this appeal. 
The Commission's attempt to distinguish United States v. Nye County, 938 F.2d 
1040 (9th Cir. 1991), is likewise unavailing. The Commission claims the case is 
distinguishable because "the offending Nevada tax was 'an ad valorem tax,' on the 
government property itself" Commission's Brief, p. 20. The Commission's attempt to 
distinguish Nye County ignores the fact that the court's characterization of the tax as an 
ad valorem tax on government property was based on the fact that the statute did not 
permit the assessing authority to segregate the beneficial user's interest in property from 
the interest retained by the government/owner. The tax assessed by Nye County was 
substantively identical to the tax assessed against ATK inasmuch as both taxes are 
assessed against the beneficial user of the property "'in the same amount and to the same 
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extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of the property.'" Nye County, 938 
F.2d at 1043, quoting^ev. Rev. Stat. § 361.159.7 
The Court held that the tax was "an ad valorem tax on property of the United 
States" because: 
Areata has no leasehold interest in [the property], but merely has the 
privilege terminable at the will of the government, to use the property at the 
time and place and in the manner directed by the United States. Nye 
County makes no attempt to segregate and tax any possessory interest 
Areata may have in the property, or Arcata's beneficial use of the property. 
Id. at 1043.8 The Commission's attempt to distinguish Nye County on the basis of the 
court's characterization of the tax as "an ad valorem tax on property of the United States," 
ignores the fact that the court made this comparison precisely because the tax was not 
limited to the value of "a lessee's possessory interest in, or a user's beneficial use of, 
property owned by the United States." Id. 
The Commission similarly claims that ATK has mistakenly relied on United States 
v. Nye County, 178 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999), claiming that "the court never analyzed the 
question or stated the proposition argued by ATK, i.e., that the full value of the property 
must be apportioned between the Government and the contractor." Commission's Brief, 
7
 Utah's statute similarly requires that the tax be imposed in "the same amount that 
the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner of the 
property." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(2). 
8
 The court cited with approval the tax in Fresno, stating "to the extent a state can 
isolate a private person's property interest in property owned by the United States, the 
state can tax the interest." Nye County, 938 F.2d at 1042. The court also cited U.S. v. 
New Mexico with approval "because the tax reached only the lessee's beneficial use." Id. 
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p. 22. The Ninth Circuit upheld Nevada's revised statute precisely because it taxed 
federal contractors "only on the portion of the property they use and the percentage of 
time they actually use it." 178 F.3d at 1086. The court referred to decades-old cases 
which "suggest[] that the tax on the use of federal property may be measured by the value 
of the property itself." However, it also observed that "the Sixth Circuit has held that the 
amount of the tax may not exceed the value of the property's use to the contractor," id, 
citing United States v. Hawkins County, 859 F.2d 20, 23 (6th Cir. 1988), and observed 
that "[t]he Supreme Court has hinted at the same." Id, citing New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 
741 n. 14 (1982). ATK cited this case to illustrate that Nevada's revised privilege tax 
statute survived constitutional scrutiny because, unlike Utah's privilege tax, it "imposed 
tax on the value of beneficial use of property rather than full, unapportioned value of the 
exempt property." ATK's Brief, p. 36. 
The Commission's mischaracterizations of the cases relied on by ATK are 
ineffective substitutes for actual case law. Utah's privilege tax on the full value of 
NIROP is in stark contrast to the tax upheld in Fresno which was based "only on the 
portion of the total value of the [property] which may be properly attributed to [the 
beneficial user's] possessory interest." Fresno, 429 U.S. at 466. Because it does not 
"account[] for any of the imposed limitations of [ATK's] use of the property," Colorado, 
460 F.Supp. at 1189, Utah's privilege tax violates the Supremacy Clause. 
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If this Court upholds the district court's interpretation of "exclusive possession," 
then it must conclude that the statute violates the Supremacy Clause by taxing the 
government's retained interest in NIROP. 
CONCLUSION 
ATK respectfully requests this Court to find that the district court erred when it 
held that ATK has "exclusive possession" of NIROP even though the Navy maintains a 
constant presence on and retains management and control of NIROP. Alternatively, if the 
Court upholds the district court's interpretation of "exclusive possession," it should find 
that the County's assessment of a privilege tax on the full value of NIROP, as required by 
Utah law, violates the Supremacy Clause by taxing the value of the Navy's retained 
interest in that property. Inasmuch as Utah law does not allow a privilege tax assessment 
for a permittee's less than exclusive possession of exempt property, the assessment for 
ATK's use of NIROP should be abated. 
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